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'I'HE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON TRANSPOITTATION EFFICIENCY* . 
Richard L. Kilmer 
The market institution in the United $tates has historically rnari-
aged the efficient use of resources. When this institution is deemed 
inefficient for the task at hand, an administrative helper may be called 
upon to assist in the rnariagernent task. Regulation of transport modes 
c01Tllllerrced in 1887 with railroads. By 1940, segments of all transporta- . 
tion modes (including rail, air, motor, water and pipeline) were under 
the regu1atory control of the federal government. Have the regulatory· 
policies ofthe .Interstate Cbrrmerce Conmission (ICC) and the Civi;_ 
Aeronautics Boaro (CAB), for example, been consistent with an effici~nt 
system? Y This que_stion ~oes not infer that, given no · irl:terference, 
the mar~~t would have achieved an efficient system. This question 
does, however, challenge the accomplishments of the regulatory agen-
. cies and does infer that a question exists as to whether the policies 
. . , . . . • , , •: I . , • 
implemented by.the above. agencies are consistent with an efficient 
system. 
In 1965, the transportation sector in total (including private 
automobiles, highway and airport construction). contributed 20 percent 
of GNP [21, p. 7], with approximately one fifth of that a;nount gener-
ated by regulated producers. In 1970, the total· net investment in 
railroads, motor transportation (including private automobiles and 
highways), domestic water transportation, pipelines, natural gas pipe-
lines and air transportationwas $310 billion [23, p. 45], 33 percent 
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of our national wealth [22, p. 9]. Of the $310 billion, $230 billion 
was accounted for by the motor transport mode, indicating the signifi-
cance of the motor vehicle in the transport system. The focus of this 
note is on the regulated producers with particular emphasis given to 
railroads, trucking, and airlines. However, the transportation sector 
is a system, and what effects the regulated producers will (to varying 
degrees) affect the unregulated producers, and vice versa. A sector 
that commands resources of the magnitude indicated above can, if mis-
managed, generate a significant distortion in the allocation of scarce 
national resources. 
In the next section, studies of transport moQ.es are presented 
that demonstrate the existence of rents '?:! which have resulted fran 
regulation. Then, the Buchanan-Tullock collective choice model is 
employed to develop decision rules that are used to determine the 
collective choice between market regulation and unencumbered market 
management. Third, a canbination of Thompson's [31] organizational 
design - environment model and previous research is presented sug-
gesting why the predictions of the Buchanan-1'ullock model are negated. 
Lastly, conclusions and implications are set forth. 
Many objectives have been suggested for a transportation system. 
They include improving the social, political and economic intercourse 
of a nation, stimulating economic growth, providing adequate transpor-
tation for reasons of national defense, and decreasing time and distance 
-3-
costs. It is suggested that these objectives are best achieved through 
public investment programs, such as the highway program and the con-
struction of airports. Other objectives include freeing the transpor-
tation system of destructive cornpetitior1 and eliminating the threat of 
high costs associated with re-establishing a m,ode or modes that have 
lost their corr:parati ve advantage and declined in importance. However, 
it is not evident that the last·two are unattainable through i;m effic-
.. . 
ient system; therefore, the objective of efficiency is· assumed. 
Regulation-Present Thinking and Social Costs 
The Weeks Report published in 1955 [34] called for less. regula-
tion and more reliance on competitive forces to e~tablish prices in 
the transportation industry. There was strong opposition to this re-
port from motor .and· water carriers because the.proposed policy appeared 
to favor railroads.. wbat has happened since 1955?. Sloss [27, p. 328] 
·. charges that : 
"Reaffirmation of the basic tenets enunciated in the 
Weeks Report by. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson. and .. Nixon 
has produced few results other .... than.·volumes ... of Con-
gressional hearings on modification of federal.trans-
port regulation. Views favoring less restrictive 
controls over entry and pricing in transportation 
. . 
have been expressed by the Council of Economic Ad-
visors and by past and. present members of the 
Department of Transportation. The American Trucking Assoc-
iation and rrembers of the Interstate Corrmerce Corrmission 
have firmly opposed any relaxation of motor carrier regu-
lation." 
Several studies indicate a price-cost deviation of regulated fi:rrn.s · 
from unregulated fi:rrn.s. Keeler [19] using 30 major domestic air travel 
markets and estimating a long· run airline cost model, detennined that 
than the estirnated unregulated fares [19, p. 399]. For 1972, mark-ups 
of 48 to 84 percent were calculated [19, p. 420]. Y Keeler's find-
ings are supported by Joroan [18] and Purvis [19, p. 421}, but disputed 
by Caves [8] .. Keeler tested his model for accuracy by predicting air 
.fares for the relatively unregulated intrastate Califorma airlines. 
The route numbers are few, but the model accuracy is very high. · 
In the trucking :ind,ustry, Sloss [27, p. 355] found ~hat regula-
tion cost Arneric~s between $348 million and $361 million per year 
during the period 1958 through 1963. For Canada, the overcharges 
range ·from $10 million to $15 million per year during the same perio(j. 
Farm.er [12, p. 402], using Department of Agriculture a!id'Icc data, 
·compared average revenues and costs per intercity ton mile for 25 
exempt (unregulated) carriers operating in Deiaware, MarYland and 
Virginia in the early 1960's with regulated carriers operatirig in the 
Middle Atlantic states (including the above 3 states). Farmer con-
cluded that exempt agricultural carriers had average revenues 41 
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percent lower than the corrmon carriers handling special freight, and 58 
percent lower than cormnon carriers. handling general freight . Also, 
. exeITipt carriers had average costs considerably 'lower than the nonexempt 
carriers.· Finhlly,a study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture [17, 
p. 166] indicated that following deregu.lation in·1956 of frozen food 
motor CarTiers, rates dropped between 11 and 29 percent with an average 
of 19 percent. During the same period., rail rates increased 6 to 14 
percent. 
In the railroad industry .which is totally regu1ated, Kolko [17, 
p. 17 OJ determined that 39 percent of the railroad stock wa.s paying 
dividends in 1888 (one year after the start of regulations) and in 
1910, 67 percent were paying dividends~ Kolko also found that during 
that same period, the average rate of dividends on all stock rose from 
2.1 (1888) to 5 percent in 1910. These findings are consistent with 
the rates of return on book investment from 1890 to 1968 [17' p, 170]. 
The Lol??ical Basis for Public (Consumer) Intervention 
The Buchanan-?llllock model [6] establishes a theory of ccil..lec-
tive choice, ·0ne must establish when the populous desires collective 
action and when private action is the preferred organization. ln 
order to facilitate. this determination, Buchanan and Tullock employ a 
cost approach whereby minimization of costs necessarily maximizes in~ 
dividual welfare.· co$ts are categorized into external costs!:!/ and 
decision making costs. 2.1· Assurriing that decisi¢n making costs only 
' . . . . . 
' 
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occur in collective decision ma.king (this does not imply that trans-
action costs are zero in the private market), it is necessarily true 
that if the external costs asso\:!iated with the private orgariization of 
an activity are less than the costs of collective organization of 
the same activity (minimum point of schedule C in Figilre 1), the rational 
individual.will choose private OI'ganization. 
The question to be addressed using the Buchanan-Tullock model is: 
should the market institution be allowed to operate unencumbered by 
regulatory constraint or is regulation needed? §! For discussion pur-
. - . 
poses, the external costs are considered to 'oe rents. It is recognized 
that external costs other than rents exist. 7/ However, perceived 
. . 
rents were one of the early reasons for regulation and today with regµ-
lation, rents still exist (as recorded earlier in this note)' even 
though all potential rents are not captured by the regulated pro~ucers 
. . 
as a result of non-price competition [10 and 35]. 
. " 
In Figure 1, s·chedule A is expected rents that remain after . im-
position of regulatory constraint on the market institution, given a 
decision rule whereby agreement fran m of n people is required in order. 
to effect group action. As m increases with respect to a given n, ex-
pected external ~osts decrease. The iarger the group (m) required to 
effect collective action, the greater the likelihood for an individual. 
. to block action unfavorable to h:lmself plus the more externalities · 
other group members will eliminate. Schedule B is the expected cost, 
in time and effort, required to secure agreement concerning the· group 
·$Rents E 
D 
F 
0 
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FIGURE 1 
n 
Number of people 
Cost of 
·Reaching 
a Policy 
to Remove 
Rents 
•\' 
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action to be taken. It is hypothesized that as group size (m) required 
for approval increases, decision costs increase. Schedule C is the 
vertical summation of schedules A and B. A rational person will mini-
mize schedule c, thus a:rTiving at a decision rule of X percent of n 
people ·.agreeing on a course of. group action. 
Given that. regulation is to be affected, the remaining rents and 
the decision cost incurred (in order to decrease rents) are min;i.ntized 
and indicated in Figure 1, level D. ,W In order to determine whether 
unencumbered market organization is preferred. by consumers as opposed 
to regulatory constraint, expected rents from market organization 21 
' . . . 
is super-imposed on Figure 1. Points E and F .represent two levels 
· of rents that could occur under market orgru1ization and point D indi-
cates the remaining rents plus decision making costs frdn a regulated 
market, assuming the p9tential of minimizing schedule C was .. fully 
realized. The decision rules are as follows~ 
At E > D 
At F ( D 
Regulatory Constraint 
No Regulatory Constraint 
In 1887 when railroad regulation was enacted, there were perceived 
rents accruing to the railroad -1.ndustry. · If consumers perceived that 
at that time E ) D, (accoroing to the Buchanan-Tullock model) regula-
tory constraint was the rational choice. In·l887, rail was the dominant 
mode and other modes were either non-existent, or of minimal competi-
tive threat to railroads. Today, nwnerous modes exist which suggests 
that even :if modes are oligopolistic intra mode, competitlv~ conditions 
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would be approximated for the transportation sector in total. For ex-
ample, railroad services· alone might ·be oligopolistic, hut if railroads 
faced un.r'egulateq·competition from trucks and automobiles, the extent 
of rents in railroads would be limited by the.motor transport shipping 
alternative . 
Based on this, expected costs (rents) from Unregulated transport 
markets have probably declined to a position such. as F ( D in Figure 
1 with dev~lopment of canpeting tr.ansport modes over time. As a result, 
one would expect decreasing emphasis on regulation. However, we have 
had increasing regul~tion! Why? 
Why Has Regulation.Policy Not. Been Altered? 
The Buchanan-Tullock model is a consumer oriented model. Many 
reasons oould be cited for its negation; however, it is argued in this 
note that the main reason is tne producer orientation possessed by the 
regulatory agencies. Thus,· in ~rd.er. to provide a framework for concep-
tualizing. a probable reason regulation has continued, the 1 organizational 
design~environment model of organization theory, a producer oriented 
model, is now presented. Thanpson [31] indicates that technology and 
the task environment are major sources of uncertainty. with which a firm 
must cope. The firm will attempt to decrease this uncertainty and pro-
vide as much determinancy as possible to the external factors that must 
be taken into consideration when rriaking decisions, assuming that the 
marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. Key elements in the organi-
zational design.,..environment model are dependency (causing uncertainty) 
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and power (attempts to decrease uncertainty). 
In this note; concern is withthe task environment and its effect 
on the firm and the firm's actions. The task envirornnent is defined as 
those parts of the environment which are relevant or potentially rele-
vant to goal setting and goal attainment [31, p. 27] . lO/ ·· The firm 
seeks control (power) over its task environment (the source of uncer-
tainty). For our purposes, the relevant entity in the firm's task envi-
ronment is the regulatory agency. The degree of certainty a firm can 
anticipate f'ran a regulatory agency and the degree of producer Wluence 
· on regulatory actions is increased as producer power is increased over 
the regulatory body. · This producers have seemingly accorrplished with 
success. ll/ 
Stigler charges that the state possesses the power of coerciqn-a . 
power that no household. or firm possesses. This allows the state to 
"ordain the physical movements of resources and the econanic decisions 
of households and firms without their consent" [ 30, p. 4] . Therefore~ . 
by utilizing the state and its powers, indust~ can increase its prof.-
itability. Stigler states that the four main policies generally. sought 
by firms include subsidies, cont:rol over entry, control of subs ti tut es 
and corrpJements, and price fixing. In parti~ular, Stigler [30, p. 51 
found that the Civil Aeronautics Board; since its inceptibn in 1938, 
has not allowed a single new trunkline. . He also found that even though 
the quantity of freight hauled by canmon carrier truckers has increased 
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and the requests for new certificates has reached 5,000 annually in 
recent years, the numbers of such carriers has decreased .. 
. Occupational licensing is another device employed by interest 
groups to improve their economic standing. Since most licensing is 
perfonred at the state level, the political process can be used to 
initiate the requirement for licensing. In order to test this hypoth-
esis, Stigler [30, p. 14] specified a function having the first year of 
I • ' ' I 
licensing aa the dependent variable and 2 independent variables:· (1) 
the ratio of occupational size to the total .labor force of a state in 
the census yearnearest tq the median year of regulation, (2) the frac-
tion .of the occupation found in cities over 100,000(over 50,000 in 1890 
and 1900) in that same year. In general, the larger the occupation and 
the larger the city, the earlier licensing regulation was enacted. 
Jonian [17] tested three hypotheses regarding the purpose of regu.-
·Iatory cormnissions .. They were consumer protection, no-effect., and pro-
ducer protection. His hypotheses were tested on interstate airlines, 
. railroads, and freight motor carriers. Given the producer protection 
hypothesis, one would.hypothesize that after regulation of competitive 
or oligopolistic firms, industrres would experience increased price 
levels,·greater price discrimination, greater rates of return and~­
stricted entry. Jordan found all to be true except rate of return 
which he found to be inconclusive. He states that, "overall, there is 
clear evidence that regulatory policies and procedures do have sub-
stantial effects on these industries, and/that these effects tend to 
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benefit producers rather than consumers" [17, p. 174]. 
Hilton [16] charges that regulatory commissiqns try for miniI.nal 
squawk behavior, plan in the short-run only, and cross subsidize un-
economic service for noneconomic reasons. He maintains that his charges 
are a result of vague directives from Congress, ambiguous rate setting 
directives, and administrators whose tenure in office is short, thus . 
adding .incentive for them to attempt to increase their chances for em-
plo~nt in the regulated industries after their regulatory employment 
has expired. 
Conclusions and Implications 
In conclusion, it has peen arguedthat rents exist as a result of 
regulation and would be reduced or· eliminated without regulation. The 
.decision rules resulting from the Buchanan-TUllock model indicate that 
rational individuals will choose market management over a regulated 
market· whenever private external costs are less than collective external 
. . . . 
costs plus decision costs.· It is argued that with the development of 
competing modes over time, there has been a decrease in private external 
costs. Referring to the Buchanan-Tullock model, it is hypothesized that 
' , 
consumers would choose market management as opposed to the current regu-
lated market; however, this has not been observed. A de-emphasis of 
regulation has not been realized because legislators and regulatory can;_ 
ffiissions are dominated by transportation interests. Therefore, the 
basic conclusion of this note is threefold. First, produc~rs have.the 
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capacity to exploit the regulatory process to their own advantage. 
Second, regulation results in higher transportation costs to consumers. 
Third; regulatory operations are predicated on producer' interest in 
the main and only secondly on consumer interest. Implications to be 
drawn from these conclusions are twofold. First, regulatory policy has 
not been consistent with an efficient transportation system. Second, 
a de...:.emphasis of regulation would be a major, and possibly sufficient, 
step to realizing competitive conditions among transportation modes. 
* 
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1. To achieve an efficient transportatibn system, the fallowing economic 
problems must be solved: "The efficient allocation of resources to 
the provision of transportation services and facilities as compared 
to other uses to which these resources might be put, with efficient 
allocation among the various agencies which supply transportation 
today and with the efficient utilization of the resources already 
allocated" [23, p. 4]. 
2. Rents are defined as that part of the firm' s income which is above 
the minimum amount necessary to keep that firm :in its given occupa-
tion. For this analys)s, however, rents are defined to include 
those profits mentioned above plus those costs associated wi.th non-
price competition (which results from the industry being price con-
strained-regulated) [10 and .. 35]. 
3, While these mark-ups imply large potential rents (profits), they do 
not accrue to the airlines because.of non'"'."price corr:petition, varia-
tion in quality being an important non-price variable [10 and 35]. 
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4.. External costs are defined a.s "costs that the indi vidtial expects to 
incur as a result of the actions of others over which he has no 
direct control" [6, p. 45]. 
5. Decision making costs are defined as "costs which 1:;he individual 
expects to incur. as a result of his own participation in an organ-
ized acti"l/ity" [6, p. 45]. 
6. For this .analysis, it is assumed that regulation is the most effic.,-
. . 
ient public alternative to an unconstrained market institution. 
7. ·For example, the necessity to arrest destructive competition both 
intra and inter mode, the high costs of re-establishing a: mode or 
modes that had lost their comparative adv.antage arid had declined fu 
importance, and maintenance of unprpfitable routes. 
8. ·In our government, most collective decisions are made bymajority 
vote. The .cost of collective organization will be greater than 
level D (minimum of schedule C) in Figure 1 if the minimum of 
·•schedule C is not associated with a rnaj ori ty vote . 
9. The rents associated with private market organization are not neces-
sarily identical with those encountered under regulatory constraint. 
Rents could accrue to a firm under regulatory constraint as a re-
sult of regulation and in excess of those that could be earned under, 
priva~e market organization. However, as the percentage of people 
required. to make a collective decision increases, the chance for 
., 
abuse decreases which decreases expected rents. 
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10. The entities of the task environment include: (1) customers, both 
distributors and users; (2) suppliers of materials, labor, capital, 
equipment arid work space; (3) competitors in markets for outputs 
and inputs; (4) regulatory groups, including governmental agencies, 
un~ons and interfirm associations. 
11. It is recognized that certain producers .and certain modes wield 
more power and influence over regulatory agencies than others. 
Power and influence are not equal wnong participants; however, in 
general, producers have considerable influ~nce wi:t;h regulatory 
agencies. Before regulation, producers did not clamor for inter-
ference because of the uncertainties that would accompany enactment. 
Now, most producers (not all) discount the idea of deregulation for 
several reasons, one of the most significant being the uncertainties 
deregulation would bring. 
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